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I. AN OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT REFORM IN CHINA 
In recent decades, the world has witnessed the explosive growth of 
China. Apart from its phenomenal economic achievement, however, China 
has long been criticized as the brazen center of pirated goods, which has 
little respect for intellectual property rights. Under international and 
domestic pressures, the National People's Congress of China (NPC) has 
modified China's Copyright Act several times since its first enactment in 
1986.1 The latest revision of China Copyright Act (2012) is under way this 
year.2 The National People's Congress of China (NPC) also has 
preliminarily scheduled ratification of the new amendment at its 2013 
Annual Meeting,3 the first meeting ever held after the transition to the new 
Communist Party (CCP) leadership in November 2012. 
On March 31, 2012, the National Copyright Administration (NCA) 
published the first draft of Revised Provisions to the Copyright Act of China 
(2012) for public review.4 The new amendment soon became a target for 
. stakeholders, especially musicians and record labels.5 The most 
controversial provision of the new amendment is section 60: 
Collective rights management organizations may apply to the Copyright 
Administration of the State Council for extended collective management 
of copyright representing the entire body of rights holders across the 
nation if the collective rights management organization has acquired 
authorizations from a substantial number of rights holders across the 
I. Liu Binjie, Chairman, Nat'l Copyright Admin. at the Eleventh Nat'l People's 
Cong. Standing Comm. 13th Meeting: On the Amendment of the Copyright Law of the 
People's Republic of China (Feb. 24, 2010), in NAT'L PEOPLE's CONG. GAZ., available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzllgongbao/20 I 0-05/1 0/contenU 580444.htm. 
2. Press Release, First Notice of Inquiries, NAT'L COPYRIGHT ADMIN. (NCAC), 
http://www.ncac.gov.cn/cms/html/309/3502/20 1203n40608.html (last visited Dec. 27, 
2012). In the First Notice of Inquiries, National Copyright Administration received over 
I ,600 postal letters from experts, musicians, business men and other citizens. More than one 
million pertinent comments could be found over the Internet about the new amendment. See 
National Copyright Administration, National Copyright Administration Annual Report of the 
Third Copyright Reform in China, CENT. ADMIN. PRESS AND PUBL'N (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.gapp.gov.cn/govpublic/96/116997 .shtml. 
3. Zhang Hong, The State Council Is Estimated to Review The Third Draft of 
Revised Provisions of Copyright Act In the End of This Year, PEOPLE NEWS (Nov. 01, 2012, 
2:59 PM), http:/llegal.people.com.cn/n/20 12/110 l/c4251 0-19455887 .html. 
4. See supra note 2. 
5. SINA Entertainment, Copyright Amendment Bill Causes Criticisms: Gao 
Xiaosong and Song Ke Opposed on Weibo, SINA NEWS (Apr. 3, 2012, 12:16 AM), http://ent.s 
ina.com.cn/y/n/20 12-04-05!12163597772.shtml; Record Labels Association Declares that 
Section 60 and 70 of the Copyright Amendment Bill Must Be Deleted, CHINA NEWS (Apr. 28, 
2012, 8:49 AM), http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2012104-28/3853299.shtml; Copyright 
Amendment Bill Caught in Fire of Musicians, NAN FANG MEDIA (Apr. 6, 2012, 8:34AM), 
http://www .chi nanews.com/cul/20 12/04-28/3853 299 .shtml. 
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nation, other than the individual rights holders announced in a written 
description declining the extended collective management by the collective 
organization. 6 
731 
Critics of the new amendment claim that this new provision IS 
conspicuously favorable to collective rights management organizations 
("CMOs"), who are thus granted an extended collective license to represent 
all rights holders, while depriving the music industry of its exclusive rights 
to monetize creative works.7 Proponents of the new amendment counter that 
an extended collective license is the optimal resolution for rights clearance 
of protected works, more specifically for mass licenses to commercial 
users.8 At the same time, rights holders would also benefit from this system 
in which they are empowered to bargain with the music industry for fair 
remunerations.9 For example, the Music Copyright Society of China 
(MCSC) has just concluded a landmark Memorandum of Understanding 
with 32 Chinese TV stations after a two-year negotiation. 10 Thirty-two TV 
stations eventually agreed to pay a royalty every time they air a song. 11 
In response to strong public opposition, four months later in July 2012, 
the framers of the new amendment rephrased section 60 in a second draft, 
deliberately narrowing the application of an extended collective license to 
only three fields: radio broadcasts, TV stations and karaoke parlors. 12 In 
terms of radio broadcast and TV stations, a compulsory license has already 
been imposed by virtue of Chinese Copyright Act. Thus, an extended 
collective license is suitable to the creator's right of remuneration under the 
compulsory license. Karaoke parlors constitute a big industry in China. In 
2011, the annual revenues of karaoke parlors in China rose to $1.5 billion. 13 
Music content providers share only approximately 0.1 percent of revenues 
with the karaoke parlors while film content providers share more than 40 
0 
6. First Drafted Revised Provisions of Copyright Act, NCAC, http://www.ncac.gov 
.cnlcms/html/309/3502/201203/740608.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (emphasis added). 
7. See supra note 5. 
8. Wang Ziqiang, A Summary of the Drafted Revised Provisions of Copyright Act, 
GAPP.GOV (Nov. 06, 2012), http://www.gapp.gov.cn!govpublic/96/116997.shtml. Wang 
Ziqiang is the director of the Department of Laws and Polices of the National Administration 
of Press and Publications. /d. 
9. Liu Ping, Vice Chairman, Music Copyright Society of China, Speech at the 
IFRRO-NCA Workshop on Copyright Protection in the Digital Age: Challenges and 
Solutions of Music, MCSCNEWS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://morp.mcsc.com.cnlwww/caction/d 
etail.php?id=45. 
10. Wang Kang, MCSC Signed Royalty Payment Contract with 32 TV Stations, CIP 
NEWS (Feb. 01, 2012, II :08 AM), http://www.cipnews.com.cnlshowArticle.asp?Articleid= 
22712. 
11. !d. 
12. Revised Provisions of Copyright Act, Second Draft, NCAC. (2012), http://www.n 
cac.gov.cn/cms/html/309/3502/20 1207 1759779.htm1. 
13. See Infra note 38. · 
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percent of revenues with cinemas each year. 14 The China Audio Video 
Copyright Association (CA VCA) was created in 2008 at the request of 
karaoke parlors to obtain licenses of songs for use in its repertoire. 15 The 
new draft intends to ratify the market monopoly of CA VCA in the statute 
and strengthen the bargaining power of CA VCA to charge karaoke parlors 
for royalties. 
In a third draft of the Revised Provisions of the Copyright Act, the 
National Copyright Administration (NCA) confirmed the aforementioned 
collective management system, which is a hybrid between the opt-out 
extended collective management system and the classic opt-in collective 
rights management system. 16 With nascent collective societies and a 
vulnerable copyright regime, it is an opportunity as well as a challenge for 
China at the helm of the new collective management system. A successful 
operation of such a hybrid system requires more transparent governance of 
CMOs and innovative mechanisms to rebalance the users' access to 
copyrighted works and authors' need for remunerations. 
II. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA 
In China, there are five collective rights management organizations: 
Music Copyright Society of China (MCSC), China Audio-Video Copyright 
Association (CA VCA), China Film Copyright Association (CFCA), China 
Written Works Copyright Society (CWWCS) and Images Copyright Society 
of China (ICSC). Music Copyright Society of China (MCSC), founded in 
1992, is the largest CMO in China. 17 The other four CMOs were nascent 
organizations, instituted after the enactment by the State Council of China 
of Regulations on Collective Rights Management Organization Rules in 
2005. 18 Among these five CMOs, China Audio-Video Copyright Society 
(CA VCA) enjoys the lru;gest revenues from its collective licenses scheme. 19 
In 2011, CAVCA collected 110 million RMB in total for its members.20 But 
CA VCA also has the highest operation/administration fee rate, estimated at 
50% in 2011 21 while MCSC, a twenty-year old CMO in China, has the 
14. /d. 
15. Editor, CA VCA Instituted As The Royalty Collector Targeting Karaoke Parlors, 
XINHUA NEWS (May 29, 2008, 9: 13 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2008-
05/29/content_8274396.htm. 
16. Wang Ziqiang, A Summary of the Drafted Revised Provisions of Copyright Act, 
NAPP.GOV (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.gapp.gov.cnlgovpublic/96/116997.shtml. 
17. Chinese Copyright Holders Received 170 million RMB in 2011, GOV.CN, 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2012-12/04/content_2282411.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
18. Yan Xiaohong, Collective Rights Management Will Play A Vital Role in Future 
Copyright Protection, NCAC.GOV.CN (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.ncac.gov.cnlcms/html/30 
9/3517 /201212n71942.html. 
19. /d. 
20. /d. 
21. /d. 
2013] Changing Tides of Collective Licensing in China 733 
lowest operation fee rate at 20% in 2011 .Z2 None of these five CMOs are 
fully member-operated. They are state-controlled and affiliated with the 
National Copyright Association. 
A. Introduction to the Extended Collective License System 
1. Extended Collective License v. Compulsory License 
Extended collective license ("ECL") rules were first introduced in 
Nordic countries in the 1960s as an effective means of solving the problem 
of broadcasters in reaching all rights holders.23 It stipulates that as soon as a 
CMO is able to show its recruitment of a substantial number of rights 
holders, the CMO would have the right to apply to represent all relevant 
rights holders on a non-exclusive basis, except for those who expressly 
decline to be represented.24 According to Professor Daniel Gervais of 
Vanderbilt Law School, such an extended collective license system follows 
an "opt-out" formula.Z5 
ECL advocates accentuate that an extended collective license is different 
from a compulsory license in that rights holders cannot veto the statutory 
grant of licenses. In an extended collective license system, member rights 
holders can choose to withdraw their membership from the CMO. In 
addition, non-member rights holders can choose to decline the extended 
licenses if they think their exclusive copyright is impaired by the CMO. 
By contrast, some scholars argue that even in cases where the right 
holders can opt out from the ECL system, the extended collective license 
may have the same effect as a compulsory license; for example, the rights 
holder might not know that her works are being used under an extended 
collective license between users and CMOs.26 
2. Wanting Qu v. Daimo Lee: You Exist In My Song 
This foreseeable conflict between CMOs and non-member rights holders 
under an extended collective license system is reflected in Wanting Qu v. 
Daimo Lee. In this case, Daimo Lee, a contestant on the TV Reality Show 
22. See supra note 18. 
23. Dr. Gunnar Karnell, Extended Collective License Clauses and Agreements in 
Nordic Copyright Law, 10 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS 73, 76 (1985). 
24. Daniel Gervais, Application of an Extended Collective Licensing Regime in 
Canada: Principles and Issues to Implementation 5 (Dept. Can. Heritage, June, 2003), 
http://aix I. uottawa.ca/ -dgervais/publications/extended_Iicensing. pdf. 
25. /d. According to Professor Gervais, classic collective license system follows an 
"opt-in" formula in which rights holders must choose to participate, the extended collective 
license is based on the opposite principle: an "opt-out" formula. 
26. Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic 
·Experience: It's a Hybrid but is it a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 476 
(2010). 
734 Michigan State International lAw Review [Vol. 21:3 
The Voice (of China), was sued by a Canadian musician for copyright 
infringement. On the show, Daimo Lee has rocketed to fame after singing a 
Chinese song "You Exist In My Song" written by plaintiff, Wanting Qu.27 
Wanting Qu, with her contracted music label, Universal Music Group 
(UMG), complained that Daimo Lee and the TV station did not obtain a 
license from her before the public show.28 Daimo Lee was also accused of 
illegally using the disputed song on his music television video.29 The TV 
station responded that it had purchased a blanket license from Music 
Copyright Society of China (MCSC) and thus were not liable to copyright 
infringement.30 The case was ultimately settled before going to trial.31 
With such a defense, the station postulated that Music Copyright Society 
of China (MCSC) would have been representing Wanting Qu regardless of 
the fact that Wanting Qu was not yet a member of the collective society. 
Under a classic license system, this presumption is evidently flawed because 
CMOs cannot license copyrighted works on behalf of non-member rights 
holders. Thus, the blanket license purchased by the station did not cover the 
copyrighted works of Wanting Qu. 
Under an extended collective license system, however, although non-
member rights holders could opt out of the system, for the most part they 
would not notice the extended collective license until the emergence of 
accused copyright infringement. In Qu's case, she might not have been 
aware of the CMO managing her copyrighted works under an extended 
collective license system until Daimo Lee and the station actually exploited 
her songs. If the extended collective license system goes into effect, it is 
likely that Wanting Qu would not have been able to allege cannot allege 
copyright infringement against the TV Station because she did not opt out 
before the grants of extended collective licenses by the Music Copyright 
Society of China (MCSC). Similarly, an extended collective license is 
analogous to a compulsory license in which rights holders only keep the 
right of remunerations from commercial users. 
3. Users Access to an Adequate Repertoire of Copyrighted Works 
There are always imbalanced attitudes of users and rights holders 
towards extended collective license: users hope to pay a fair amount of 
27. The judges overwhelmingly acclaimed Lee's performance. Three of four judges 
wanted him to work for them, respectively. UMG Sued Daimo Lee for Copyright 
Infringement, PEOPLE NEWS (Aug. 31, 2012, 12:05 AM), http:/lmedia.people.com.cn/n/2012/ 
0831/c40606-18881442.html. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. 
30. Xu Ning & Shi Xisheng Zhang Yun, UMG Sued The Voice for Copyright 
Infringement, SINA NEWS (Aug. 4, 2012, 8:15 AM), http://ent.sina.eom.cn/y/20 12-08-04/120 
53703073.shtm. 
31. See GERVAIS, supra note 24. 
2013] Changing Tides of Collective Licensing in China 735 
money for an "adequate"32 repertoire of music, while rights holders demand 
to control the exclusive dissemination of copyrighted works. 
The music industry in China worries that if extended collective license 
becomes prevalent, its current business model will collapse?3 Take an 
extreme example: the music industry in China argued that, in an extended 
collective license system, competing record labels may monetize the music 
works of other music labels before their competitors notice the 
appropriation?4 More specifically, music works can be performed by any 
singer in any concert in the name of extended collective license authorized 
by CMOs?5 
The music industry cannot tolerate losing exclusive exploitation of their 
copyrighted works. For example, Song Ke, a godfather in Chinese album 
industry, upset by the slow down of album industry, shut down his record 
label and opened a new Peking duck restaurant last year.36 But only six 
months later, after his famous outcry that "album is dead," he returned to 
the music industry and became the general manager of a newly launched 
music company, Hengda Music, Inc.37 In an interview, Song Ke announced 
to his audience, "album is dead, but music is alive."38 He expected his 
company to expand monetizing their large stock of 3,500 new songs 
assigned by music creators from live concerts and digital music39 since live 
concert and digital music contributed notably increased profits to Chinese 
music companies in recent years.40 In opposition, commercial intermediaries 
claimed that the extended collective license system managed by CMOs 
would threaten their exclusive exploitation and distribution of copyrighted 
works. 
By contrast, some commercial users have a growing demand for an 
adequate repertoire of music works. Take karaoke parlors industry as an 
example. Karaoke parlors in China compete with each other in some areas, 
i.e., the price of ticket, the quality of service and the quantum of songs in its 
music storage system. It is not rare that some customers have a very 
customized preference of some brand new songs. As a result, karaoke 
parlors usually confront a desperate need for an adequate music repertoire 
32. See Xiaohong, supra note 18. 
33. Han Lei, Music Industry Cannot Survive Without Royalty Revenues, PEOPLE 
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012, I :45 PM), http://ip.people.corn.cn/GB/17543690.html. 
34. /d. 
35. /d. 
36. Eric Priest, Assistant Professor, Univ. of Or. Law School, Keynote Speech on 
Chinese Music Industry Addressed at Michigan State University College of Law's 2012 IP 
Creative Upstarts Conference (Nov. 10, 2012). 
37. Xie Mengyao, The Man Is Back: Song Ke Returns to Music Industry After 
Launching His Peking Duck Restaurant, HEXUN NEWS (July 16, 2012, 2:05 PM), 
http://news.hexun.com/20 12-07-16/143616457 .html. 
38. /d. 
39. !d. 
40. /d. 
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obtained from CMOs. Extended collective license is an optimal resolution 
of the rights clearance for karaoke parlors. With an extended collective 
license, karaoke parlors can expand their music repertoire as much as 
possible to meet the growing demands of its customers. Music creators, 
even those non-member rights holders, can have remunerations from 
karaoke parlors as creative content providers in the booming industry. 
Extended collective licenses can also pitch in rights clearance problems 
encountered by new media. Mass usage of copyrighted works is a key 
feature of the new media. Take Internet Radio as an example. Pandora, the 
popular Internet Radio Station in United States has over 800,000 tracks in 
its library, tens of hundreds of times more than its traditional competitors, 
the AMIFM radio stations.41 Pandora's stock of music keeps growing to 
meet the personalized demands of millions of audiences.42 
The mass usage of music in a digital age calls for more cost-effective 
means of rights clearance. It is onerous, if not impossible, for users to 
contact with scads of rights holders for licenses. Moreover, it is also costly 
for CMOs to find out every artist listed in the billboard of Pandora, even 
though few audiences might play the song. The extended collective license 
system is an optimal mechanism to reduce transaction costs between CMOs 
and rights holders. Moreover, CMOs managing extended collective licenses 
would also acquire remunerations for the universality of artists including 
those non-aligned rights holders.43 
B. Implementing Extended Collective License System 
Under an extended collective license system, CMOs in China grant 
rights in works not only of authors who cede their copyright to the CMO but 
also those authors remaining outside of the CMO. One might contend that 
the implement of an extended collective license system violates the Berne 
principle of exclusive reproduction right. According to Professor Jane 
Ginsburg, however, this argument is rather meaningless.44 The basic 
assumption underlying the creation of CMOs is the inability of authors to 
41. See Note, CBS v. ASCAP: Performing-Rights-Societies and The Per Se Rule, 87 
YALE L. J. 783, 786 (1978) (estimating that an AM/ FM radio station in the 1970s could 
broadcast over 6,000 tracks); Laura Houston Santhanam et al., Audio: How Far Will Digital 
Go?, PEw RESEARCH CENTER, http:/lstateofthemedia.org/2012/audio-how-far-will-digital-go/ 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2012) (estimating that the United States program iHeart Radio offers 
consumers II million songs). 
42. Music Licensing Part One: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Intellectual 
Prop., Competition and the Internet Comm. on the Judiciary, 112lh Cong. (2012) (statement 
of Jeffrey A. Eisenach) (showing that the percentage of Americans who listened to online 
radio has grown by nearly 50 percent in the last two years and now to 39% of Americans 
listen to their music online). 
43. See Kang, supra note I 0. 
44. Jane Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University Research or 
Teaching, 39 J. COPYRIGHTSOC'Y U.S.A. 181, 198 (1992). 
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enforce their rights.45 Thus, "it is difficult to argue that ECL-statutes have 
deprived authors of a right that, practically speaking, was impossible to 
enforce prior to the existence of the ECL-statutes.'.46 In China, some authors 
in remote areas may never discover that they should join the CMO for 
remunerations; the extended collective license could overcome this 
information asymmetry between rights holders and CMOs. In this section, 
the author will address two issues: first, who can manage the extended 
collective license system in China, and second, how can CMOs manage this 
brand new system in China. 
1. Who Can Manage The Extended Collective License System 
in China? 
From the plain language of the extended collective license clause of the 
newly drafted amendment of China's Copyright Act, a CMO can apply to 
manage the extended collective license only when it is able to show its 
recruitment of a substantial number of rights holders. What does it mean by 
"a substantial number"? Does it mean "a majority"? The word "substantial" 
is not defined in the new amendment. 
Assume that "a substantial number" means "a majority" or in other 
words "more than fifty percent.'' It is still a theoretical invariable hardly 
accepted into practice because the total exact number of rights holders is 
unknown. As a result, the appropriate percentage of a majority varies when 
the sum number is uncertain. Even if the total number of relevant rights 
holders can be pinpointed, "the need for a CMO to meet the 50%+ 1 
criterion would almost inevitably lead to recruitment wars.'.47 In Nordic 
countries, "a substantial number" is defined by the Minister of Culture or 
Education. The Administration will take both the quality and quantity of the 
number into consideration when determining whether to grant an extended 
collective license to a CMO or not.48 In Russia, a pre-accreditation 
mechanism was introduced in 2008 to fix the emerging problems of the 
legal presumption clause of the Russian copyright act.49 Under the new 
45. /d. 
46. /d. 
47. See Gervais, supra note 24, at 37. 
48. See id. at 33 (suggesting that the administration should be given the discretion to 
determine "a substantial number" in reference to four measuring criterion: the presumed 
number of rights holders concerned; the ease of finding and contacting them; the efforts 
made by CMO; and the response obtained). 
49. Dmitry Golovanov, Transformation of Authors Rights' and Neighboring Rights 
in Russia, EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/iris/iris 
_plus/iplus2_2008.pdf.en (last visited Dec. 24, 2012); In the 2012 copyright reform, the 
Congress of Philippine are taking the similar option of a prior accreditation system. With the 
prior accreditation functions, the Intellectual Property Office of Philippine will be able to 
exercise some form of regulations or adjudications over the CROs to ensure that there is no 
abuse, that royalties are properly remitted to the rights owners, and that blanket license fees 
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amendment, only those CMOs accredited by the National Copyright 
Administration can represent all rights holders without prior consent.50 The 
issues related to extended collective licenses become more complicated 
when there is the coexistence of two or more CMOs.51 As a result, many 
countries choose one CMO model to manage extended collective license, 
which in turn causes antitrust concerns.52 
By virtue of existent copyright statutes, the copyright administration of 
China is inclined to adopt one CMO model in one particular category to 
manage extended collective licenses. In Article 7 of Regulations on 
Collective Rights Management Organization Rules, the state council 
stipulates that the field of interests of new CMOs shall not overlap with the 
field of interests of an existent CMO in China.53 In other words, the state 
council only approves new CMOs to manage new categories of copyrights 
not covered by existent CMOs. After the enactment of Regulations on 
Collective Rights Management Organization Rules in 2005, China Audio-
Video Copyright Association (CA VCA), China Film Copyright Association 
(CFCA), China Written Works Copyright Society (CWWCS) and Images 
Copyright Society of China (ICSC) were founded.54 None of these four 
CMOs manage cooperative categories of copyrights. The newly drafted 
amendment of China Copyright Act did not define this issue. An extended 
collective license system managed by monopolistic CMO in divided areas 
may eliminate the uncertainty of who can manage the ECL system, but it 
also enhances the magnitude of antitrust requirements. 
2. How Can CMOs Manage Extended Collective License 
System in China? 
a. CAVCA Makes the "Pie" for Rights Holders 
In 2006, the State Council of China built up China Audio-Video 
Copyright Association (CAVCA), 47 years after the establishment of BMI 
are not onerous for end users. Antonio Ray A. Ortiguera, IP Code Amendment: To Accredit a 
Pied Piper?, BusiNESS WORLD ONLINE, www.Bworldonline.com/adserver/bworldonline/print 
_preview.php?article_id=58697 (last visited Dec. 24, 2012). 
50. Golovanov, supra note 49. Ortiguera, supra note 49. 
51. See Mengyao, supra note 37. 
52. COPY-DAN, an umbrella CMO leading seven separate CMOs in Denmark, is 
authorized by the administration to grant extended collective license to users. KOPINOR, an 
umbrella CMO grouping together twenty-one collective societies in Sweden, is authorized by 
the administration to grant extended collective license to users. See Kopinor, INTERNATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF REPRODUCfiON RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS (Sept. 3, 2012, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.ifrro.org/members/kopinor; see also Ziqiang, supra note 8. 
53. Zhuzuo Jfti quan Guanli Tiaon (~f'F • ~f*~~~#i]) [Collective Management 
of Copyright Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 28 2004, effective Mar. I, 
2005) 2005 ST. CouNCIL GAZ. 7 (China). 
54. See Xiaohong, supra note 18. 
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and almost a century after the establishment of ASCAP.55 The debut of 
China Audio-Video Copyright Association (CAVCA) in the music market 
was its collection of royalties from karaoke parlors in 2007.56 Every karaoke 
parlor needs to pay an amount of $2 per booth per day for the public 
performance rights of composers and publisher. 57 
At the very beginning, nascent CA VCA were degraded by karaoke 
parlors. Few karaoke parlors contacted CAVCA for a blanket license. After 
hundreds of cases against karaoke parlors, CA VCA started to produce 
revenue from karaoke parlors. 58 From 2007 to 2009, CA VCA has filed over 
960 cases against karaoke parlors and collected over $30 million in revenue 
from the royalty charges.59 
In order to charge royalty efficiently, TianTai, Inc. ("TTl"), a private 
commissioner of CAVCA, established 26 wholly owned subsidiaries in 18 
major areas around the nation.60 These subsidiaries have police functions -
monitoring the usage of music works by karaoke parlors. In order to cover 
the high operating costs of these wholly owned subsidiaries and their 
hundreds of employees, payments made by karaoke parlors are thus split 
50150 between CA VCA and copyright holders.61 This unilateral command 
of royalty distribution inevitably disappointed other market participants in 
China.62 
CA VCA counter argued that the 50/50 royalty distribution plan was 
temporary. As long as the organization matures, the operation fee will 
gradually drop as what ASCAP does in the past century. They challenged 
that, copyright holders only saw how CA VCA divides the "pie" but they 
selectively ignored the fact that CAVCA enlarges the "pie" for them. Half 
of a larger "pie" is much better than a whole smaller "pie" that individual 
rights holders could have ever earned themselves. They reemphasized the 
55. CHINA AUDIO-VIDEO COPYRIGHT ASSOCIATION, available at http://www.cavca.or 
g/enindex.php (last visited Apr. 22, 20 12). 
56. The Second Annual Conference of CA VCA Members, CHINA AUDIO-VIDEO 
COPYRIGHT AssOCIATION, http://www.cavca.org/news.php?un=ztxw_list&up=36 (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2012). 
57. /d. 
58. Zhimggu6 Yinzhu Xiedul Beijing 100 Jiiiqinqutin KTV Tfqlsusong 
( cp 00%~t9.J. X'.t ~t* 100*{~ ;f:l( KTV:fn:!Bl will) Xinhua News (Oct. 17, 2008), http://news.xi 
nhuanet.cornllegal/2008-1 0/17 /content_ I 021 1180.htm. 
59. /d. 
60. See The Second Annual Conference of CA VCA Members, supra note 56. 
61. /d. 
62. In 2009, hundreds of karaoke parlors in Guangdong Province, the birthplace of 
Dr. Sun Yat-sun, boycotted the per location fee rate made by CAVCA. They complaint that, 
$12 per location fee rate is too high and has deprived their profits capability. As the 
exclusive collective rights organization in the market, CA VCA refused to compromise with 
those karaoke parlors. See Harry Yang, Who is the Final Winner in the Karaoke Parlors 
Royalty Dispute?, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Feb. 2007, available at http://www.china 
ipmagazine.com/en/joumal-show.asp?id=373. 
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case of karaoke parlors: without the 960 litigations filed by CA VCA against 
thousands of karaoke parlors around the nation, it would take another five 
years for individual copyright holders to realize their public performance 
rights among karaoke parlors in the chaos market of China. 
Besides karaoke parlors, the next major interest groups targeted by 
CA VCA are hotels that provide copyrighted entertainment to consumers. 
The reality is that there are thousands of small hotels and world-class hotel 
chains in China. It is impractical for individual rights holders to negotiate 
with these thousands of small hotels located in different areas of the nation 
vis-a-vis for royalty collections. One of the possible solutions is collective 
rights management by CA VCA. 
Although CA VCA plays a vital role in implementing public performance 
rights of individual authors in China, many stakeholders in the music 
industry concerns that CA VCA might abuse its market monopoly and 
distort the fair market value of copyrighted works. The opaque royalty 
distribution process of CA VCA also exacerbates its failure of transparent 
governance, which in tum deprives authors of fair remunerations. Under an 
extended collective license system, royalty distribution becomes more 
complex between CMOs and non-aligned rights holders. Some experts 
advocate that, in special circumstances where non-aligned rights holders are 
untraceable and the remuneration is deemed to be not enough to justify 
individual distribution, a cultural fund might be a preferable option to 
disburse these orphan royalties.63 
b. Relations Between Chinese CMOs and Foreign 
Authors 
By virtue of the extended collective license clause of the new copyright 
amendment, if a CMO acquires the authorization from a substantial number 
of rights holders, it can apply to represent all rights holders. Does this 
provision include foreign authors? 
The answer to this question would highly likely be yes. Under the classic 
opt-in license system, Chinese CMOs can represent foreign authors on the 
basis of reciprocal agreements between Chinese CMOs and foreign 
equivalent CMOs. Arguably, as long as a Chinese CMO recruits the largest 
percentage of domestic rights holders and contract with the majority of 
foreign CMOs in the world, it would satisfy the "substantial number" 
requirement and represent all rights holders including domestic and 
overseas rights holders, aligned and non-aligned rights holders. In the 
birthplace of extended collective license system, most Nordic countries 
recognize the extended collective license of CMOs so long as the CMO 
concludes reciprocal agreements with most major CMOs around the world. 
63. See Gervais, supra note 24, at 51. 
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In China, most CMOs have reciprocal agreements with foreign CMOs. 
For example, Music Copyright Society of China (MCSC) has signed 
reciprocal agreements with 53 equivalent CMOs around the world including 
the four major CMOs in U.S., such as ASCAP, BMI, SESAC and 
HAFOX.64 Other CMOs in China have separate reciprocal agreements with 
foreign CMOs. Some scholars suggest an umbrella CMO associated by 
these separate collective societies. Without signing separate reciprocal 
agreements, an umbrella CMO is deemed to represent all members of its 
founding collective societies and thus has the largest percentage of rights 
holders both from domestic and from foreign nations. An umbrella CMO 
also works as a central mechanism remitting collected royalties to its 
foreign partners. 
Ill. CALL FOR REFORM IN A DIGITAL AGE 
The development of technology has profoundly changed society. Ten 
years ago, people purchased physical albums to enjoy their favorite songs. 
Today, a growing number of music fans resort to mobile phones, tablet 
computers, and live concerts for entertainment. Internet radio, stream 
portals, digital ringtones and other user-generated platforms have emerged 
and flourished in many nations. According to Professor Sean Pager, ''just as 
mobile technologies have allowed developed countries to leapfrog wired 
infrastructure and develop innovative e-commerce models, so too, 
developing countries have an opportunity to bypass outdated legal standards 
and pioneer 21st century models. "65 With a growing middle class and 
ubiquitous Internet and mobile technology, China represents a key frontier 
for the reform of collective licensing of author's rights.66 
64. Reciprocal Agreements with Foreign CMOs, MCSC.COM.CN, http://www.mcsc 
.com.cnlmcsclnforList.php?partid=7 (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
65. Sean A. Pager, Accentuating the Positive: Building Capacity for Creative 
Industries into the Development Agenda for Global Intellectual Property Law, 28 AM. U. 
INT'LL. REv. 223,287 (2012). 
66. Annual Report 20//, CISAC, http://www.cisac.org/CisacPortal/security.do;jsessi 
onid=4886A 77E8A3C51 FA 194964082897C9DA ?method=beforeAuthenticate (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2013). CISAC, the International Confederations of Societies of Authors and 
Composers, is launching a specific BRICS strategy seeking to mobilize its members, and 
position CISAC as a leader in the promotion of Intellectual Property rights in these emerging 
countries. CISAC is also building a momentum towards a copyright conference specifically 
for BRICS countries in 2014. BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa, an acronym coined by Jim 0' Neil, a Goldman Sachs economist in 2001. 
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A. Transparent Governance of CMOs in China 
1. An Umbrella CMO as the Supply Apparatus for Subset CMOs 
An umbrella CMO is an association of associations, instituted by the 
other CMOs in a nation-examples include ECAD in Brazil, COPY-DAN 
in Denmark and KOPINOR in Sweden.67 An umbrella CMO oversees the 
administration, accounting- and technology departments of its member 
CMOs, and each member CMO has its representatives in the board or 
directors, supervising the joint umbrella CMO. The proposal of an umbrella 
CMO to manage the extended collective license has three strengths. 
First, an umbrella CMO makes it easier to define the statutory premise to 
apply extended collective license. An umbrella CMO is an association of all 
the CMOs in a nation and it is deemed to represent all the members of these 
founding CMOs. Therefore, it can be inferred that an umbrella CMO has the 
largest percentage of rights holders compared with its founding member 
CMOs. 
Second, an umbrella CMO alleviates copyright fragmentation in the 
digital environment. In general, fragmentation of copyright means that users 
of the copyrighted work need a license from each fragment of the copyright 
bundle. For instance, multimedia work is usually divided into various 
components such as a sound, an image, a photograph, or a software 
program, where rights clearance is required for each subcomponent.68 An 
umbrella CMO can work as "a single window" of rights clearance for users 
of multimedia works in the digital environment. Moreover, an umbrella 
CMO can also play a role of a one-stop shop for pan-territoriallicense.69 
Third, an umbrella CMO allocates resources for cultural affirmative 
actions in the society. In special circumstances in which the non-aligned 
rights holders are untraceable, and the remuneration is deemed to be not 
enough to justify individual distribution, the umbrella CMO can choose to 
disburse the royalties to a fund, supporting affirmative projects for 
independent artists.70 Moreover, the umbrella CMO can also use the fund to 
educate young artists, to award new talents and to promote new genres.71 
67. See Xiaohong, supra note 18. 
68. Daniel Gervais & Alana Maurushat, Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented 
Management: Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management, 2 CAN. 1. L. & TECH. 15, 20 
(2003). 
69. For example, with respect to the EU Commission Proposal of Directive on 
Collective Management of Copyright and its Related Rights, Belgian Society of Authors, 
Composers and Publishers ("SABAM") has just concluded a landmark agreement with 
Google. SABAM became the first medium size CMO in Europe to offer a one-stop shop for 
music repertoire on a pan-territorial basis. News Release, SABAM, (Dec. 19, 20 12), 
available at http://www.sabam.be/sites/default/files/pdf/google_play_en.pdf. 
70. Mengyao, supra note 37, at 5 I. 
71. See infra note 108, at 4. For example, the CISAC model contract provides that" . 
. . each of the societies shall be entitled to deduct from the sums collected by it on behalf of 
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For example, the Malaysian collective management organization, MACP, 
spends 2% of its annual gross revenues on music promotion activities such 
as music awards, competitions, copyright workshops and seminars.72 
Besides its notable strengths in implementing an extended collective 
license system, the intrinsic drawback of this two-tiered management 
structure is the increased administrative costs. For instance, ECAD, the 
umbrella CMO in Brazil, deducts 17 percent operation fees from its total 
revenues, while in the meantime its member CMOs deduct 7.5 percent in 
operation fees from the total royalties.73 It is arguable that in a long run, 
however, the total operation fees will drop down because the umbrella 
CMO functions as a central supply apparatus providing uniform 
administrative, accounting and technology services to its member CMOs. 
As a result, its member CMOs do not waste their budgets on separate 
administrative, accounting, and technology departments. 
2. Regulate CMOs Under Principles of Company Law 
CMOs are neither perfect nor a panacea for collective license in China. 
They have been criticized for lack of transparency, lack of efficacy, and 
abuse of market monopoly. In some countries, CMOs are registered under 
company law and thus must adhere to the regulation of company acts, i.e., 
publishing accounting information to shareholders.74 In China, CMOs are 
state-owned and the disclosure of accounting information is not mandatory. 
The copyright act of China only stipulates that CMOs shall report 
accounting information to the Copyright Administration, and rights holders 
instead shall apply to access and reproduce the financial reports of CMOs.75 
In real life, it is usually burdensome for rights holders to acquire accounting 
information from the bureaucratic officials.76 Even in the case that CMOs 
agreed to disclose their accounting information to applicants, the released 
accounting information is more often than not incomplete and useless. 
Rights holders rarely know about each payment in the administrative 
process of CMOs. The author of this article suggests that the legislature of 
China takes one step further by specifying the items of accounting 
the co-contracting society 10% at the maximum, which shall be allocated to ... the purposes 
of supporting its members' pensions, benevolent or provident funds, or for the 
encouragement of the national arts, or in favor of any funds serving similar purposes." /d. 
72. !d. 
73. Volker Ralf Grassmuck, A Copyright Exception for Monetizing File-Sharing: A 
Proposal for Balancing User Freedom and Author Remuneration in the Brazilian Copyright 
Law Reform, VGRASS.DE (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www. vgrass.de/?p=l93. 
74. THE INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHT SOCIETY LIMITED, http://www.iprs.org/index.asp 
(last visited Dec. 28, 20 12). 
75. Regulation on Collective Management of Copyright, art. 31, 32 (promulgated by 
the State Council, Dec. 28, 2004, effective Mar. I, 2005) (China). 
76. CMOs in China are state-controlled and most employees of CMOs receive 
stipends directly from the government. 
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information and mandating its publication during the administration of 
CMOs. As Justice Louis Brandeis said, "[s]unlight is the best 
disinfectant."77 The openness of accounting information helps rights holders 
and end users supervise the routine operation of CMOs. 
Besides disclosure of accounting information, democratizing the 
directory board also accelerates the course of transparent governance of 
CMOs. In China, CMOs are state-controlled and most employees of CMOs 
receive stipends directly from the government. CMOs in China operate 
more like an administration agency rather than a collective society. Rights 
holders have little control of the royalty allocation plan and the operation 
fee deduction. A possible direction for the reform of Chinese CMOs might 
be recruitment of rights holders to the directory board and guarantee their 
voting strength in royalty distribution plans.78 It is a way to empower rights 
holders in the supervision of CMOs. The check and balance from a diverse 
body of rights holders would thus enhance the transparency and efficacy of 
CMOs and in return promote the welfare of rights holders. 
B. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for CMOs in China 
1. Rate Court for Flat Rate Dispute 
In 1941, ASCAP and BMI entered into an antitrust decree with the U.S. 
govemment.79 There are various restrictions on ASCAP and BMI under the 
antitrust consent decree. For example, the BMI antitrust consent decree 
prohibits BMI from itself publishing, recording or distributing music 
commercially (Section IV (B)), from refusing to contract with a potential 
affiliate (Section V (A)), and from discriminating between similarly situated 
77. Louis Grumet, Sunlight Is The Best Disinfectant, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajour 
nal/200311203/nv/nv2.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). 
78. See Xiao Hong, supra note 18. In 2013, CA VCA, CSSWC and ICSC will have a 
power transition of their director board. Members of these CMOs will vote new 
representatives in the director board. It is the first election for the director board of CA VCA, 
which was founded in 2008. By contrast, Chinese record labels have already made a history 
of collective rights management in 2012. The Department of Recording Industry of CA VCA 
elected their new board members. More than forty record labels from inland, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan that have over ninety-percent market shares of Chinese recording industry 
participated in the meeting. New directors were appointed, all from the recording industry. 
New Director General is Lu Jian, the CEO of Haidie Record Label. This meeting has a 
historic meaning. As observed, it converted an affiliated department of CA VCA into a quasi 
collective society of record labels. At this meeting, record labels also announced that if 
section sixty of the first draft of copyright act amendment adopted, they would segregate the 
Department of Recording Industry from CA VCA and institute their own CMO. Han Lei, 
Without Royalties, Music Industry Cannot Stand, PEOPLE NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012, 13:45 AM), 
http://ip.people.com.cn/GB/17543690.html. 
79. Carly Olson, Changing Tides in Music Licensing? BMI v. DMX and In re THP, 
10 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 278 (2012); see also United States v. Broad. Music, 
Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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licenses (Section VIII). 80 In the antitrust consent decree of ASCAP, there is 
a "rate court" provision providing that when the negotiation of fee rate 
between licensers and licensees is broken up, the court has the power to 
order a reasonable license fee. 81 
Nowadays, when voluntary agreements between CMOs and commercial 
users cannot be reached, federal rate courts usually make decisions as to 
what license fees will be.82 Some scholars thus observed that, CMOs are in 
the "business of yes."83 Under the antitrust consent decree, ASCAP and 
BMI could hardly deny a license to a user who prepared to pay the prices set 
by federal rate court.84 Even CMOs that do not operate under antitrust 
decrees, such as SESAC or CCC, would think twice before saying no to a 
willing licensee.85 
In recent years, the U.S. federal rate court has been involved in the 
movement to reform the blanket license of ASCAP and BMI. In BMI v. 
DMX, after a bench trial, the court ruled that an Adjustable Fee Blanket 
License (AFBL) is applicable to DMX.86 AFBL is a blanket license from 
BMI with a carve-out for a direct licensing program from individual music 
authors or their publisher-representatives.87 In this case, the court rejected 
the argument made by plaintiff that the court should set a fee rate solely on 
the basis of the fees BMI charged on other users. The court cautioned that, it 
is unjust because the monopoly such as BMI and ASCAP would subject all 
users to an unreasonably high rate.88 For example, per location fee rate 
charged by BMI on DMX, Inc. has risen from $12 to $36 in five years 
(2004- 2009).89 
To promote competition in the market place, the court adopted DMX' s 
proposal for a blanket license fee with adjustments for its ongoing direct 
licensing program.90 The structure of DMX's proposal can be depicted 
algebraically as:91 Per-Location Fee= Floor Fee+ [Unbundled Music Fee x 
Shares licensed via CR0].92 This per location flat fee rate dispute between 
DMX and BMI is similar to the per booth flat fee rate dispute between 
80. Broad. Music, 275 F.3d at 172. 
81. /d. 
82. JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BARABEC, MUSIC, MONEY, AND SUCCESS: THE 
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO MAKJNG MONEY IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 318,318-19 (1994). 
83. Daniel Gervais, The Landscape of Collective Management Schemes, 34 COLUM. 
J. L. & ARTS 591,597 (2011). 
84. /d. 
85. /d. 
86. Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 355, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see 
also United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 316 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2003). 
87. /d. 
88. Showtime, 912 F.2d at 570; In re THP, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
89. DMX, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d at 358. 
90. /d. at 356-57. 
91. /d. at 356. 
92. /d. 
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karaoke parlors and CA VCA in China. By contrast, karaoke parlors in 
China do not have such a rate court to draw a compromise from the 
CA VCA and set up a new flat fee rate for karaoke parlors. CA VCA 
imposed the $2 per booth flat fee rate on karaoke parlors and arrogantly 
ignored their opponents. 
A rate court can play a crucial role of antitrust mechanism against 
monopolistic CMOs in China. An adjustable fee blanket license recognized 
by rate court allows individual rights holders to compete with their CMOs 
and to reflect the fair market value of their copyrighted works in a direct 
license program. Under an adjustable fee blanket license system, the 
deduction of direct license fee rate stimulates users to reach rights holders 
directly. It might help CMOs in China identify non-aligned rights holders 
and remit royalties to them. The chance of remuneration for non-aligned 
rights holders under an extended collective license system thus increases. 
To realize the promise of a rate court, two major issues need to be 
clarified in the context of Chinese CMOs: First, judges in China have less 
discretion than U.S. judges when deciding a case. In a civil law system, it is 
less tolerable for Chinese judges to set up a flat fee rate for karaoke parlors 
in the absence of a written statute. Should China create a brand new rate 
court expertise in antitrust dispute between users and CMOs? Or instead 
building a regulatory administration erects adjudicatory functions upon the 
disputes between users and CMOs in China? Second, whether an adjustable 
fee blanket license has price advantage over a traditional blanket license 
from CMO. If CMOs set unreasonably high floor fee rate in an adjustable 
fee blanket license, the total amount of flat fees might exceed the price of a 
single traditional blanket license. A rate court or an adjudicatory 
administration needs to scrutinize the floor fee rate of an adjustable fee 
blanket license agreement between users and CMOs in this case. 
2. Arbitration Board for Royalty Claims 
As aforementioned, in a case when non-aligned rights holders are 
untraceable, CMOs in China can choose to disburse the royalties in a fund 
for cultural affirmative actions. What if the deemed untraceable non-aligned 
rights holder voluntarily contacts CMOs for royalty claims? What if rights 
holders dissatisfy with the royalty distribution schemes? An arbitration 
board under the umbrella of National Copyright Administration might be a 
possible solution. 
An arbitration board can moderate disputes between rights holders and 
CMOs. For instance, a rights holder may file complaints to the arbitration 
board to rebut an unreasonable royalty distribution scheme. After 
exhausting the procedure of arbitration, either party in the royalty dispute 
case can appeal to a regular court attacking the arbitration board's decision. 
In other words, the final decision of an arbitration board for CMOs must 
subject to appeals to court. 
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According to some scholars, this arbitration-adjudication structure is too 
complicated and costly to be recommended to developing countries.93 
Rather a specialized court would be a preferable option in lieu of the 
arbitration board. For instance, in Britain, a copyright tribunal competent for 
all kinds of cases has proved adequate to solve aforementioned issues.94 
C. CMOs As Royalty Managing Instruments 
Authors are not supposed to spend their time going after their rights. 
They create. 95 
I. Pros and Cons of Collective Rights Management 
The evocative story of collective rights management recounts the visit of 
a French composer to a Paris Cafe in 1847.96 Ernest Bourget, a famous 
French composer of popular chansons and chansonettes comiques, found 
his music, among other pieces, was played by the cafe without his 
permission.97 He then refused to settle the bill for his drink arguing that 
"you consume my music, I consume your wares."98 
Ernest Bourget understood that, as an individual composer, he should not 
devote his life chasing unauthorized performances of his music.99 On the 
other hand, it is also unnecessarily expensive for each venues performing 
popular music to track and negotiate with various rights holders in 
France. 100 
As a solution to the failures of individual contracting, Ernest Bourget, 
with his colleagues Victor Parizot, Paul Henrion and Jules Colombier, 
founded an Agence Centrale, a predecessor of the first modem collecting 
society Societe des Auteurs et Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique 
(SACEM) established in 1851. 101 
According to Professor Jane Ginsburg, a similar problem torturing Ernest 
Bourget in mid-nineteenth century has analogies in contemporary society, 
e.g., educational reprography, library archives and file sharing in the 
93. Sibylle E. Schlatter, Copyright Collecting Societies in Developing Countries: 
Possibilities and Dangers, in NEW FRONTIER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 53, 68 
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders ed., 2005). 
94. /d. 
95. See Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking 
The Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 245, 553-57 
(2005). 
96. Richard Watt, Copyright And Contract Law: Economic Theory Of Copyright 
Contracts, 18 J. lNTELL. PROP. L. 173, 199 (2010). 
97. !d. 
98. /d. 
99. /d. 
100. !d. 
101. Watt, supra note 96, at 199. 
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cyberspace. 102 In the century-long practice of collective rights management, 
however, some pros and cons of CMOs have been debated repeatedly 
among experts and scholars. 
A traditional theory promoting collective rights management is that it 
reduces transaction costs between individual rights holders and numerous 
users. 
103 The costs of monitoring, negotiating, and enforcing rights by 
individual authors might exceed what they can reasonably hope to collect. 104 
Other concerns focus on the greater access to a repertoire of copyrighted 
works and the simplified price structure that users would prefer through a 
CM0. 105 Moreover, others supports that CMOs would strengthen the 
bargaining power of individual rights holders in the market. Otherwise, 
individual rights holders can be easily discriminated by the user who may 
decide never to use the work of a particular artist who has demanded for his 
rightful royalties. 106 
To the contrary, some argue that the increased administrative costs of 
CMOs might exceed the saved transaction costs between individual rights 
holders and users. 107 Other scholars illustrate that the blanket license by 
CMOs limits broadcast airtime for new artists and exacerbate the 
inequitable SuperStar effects in music industry .108 Other scholars propose 
that technology advancement profoundly undermines the classic transaction 
costs theory of collective rights management. 109 According to Professor 
Ivan Reidel, in music license markets 3.0, an eBay or Google like online 
102. Jane Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The "Information Superhighway'": Authors, 
Exploiters And Copyright in Cyberspace, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN DIGITAL 
ENVIRONMENT 189, 210 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996); Jane Ginsburg, Reproduction of 
Protected Works for University Research or Teaching, 39 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'T U.S.A. 181 
(1992). 
103. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION EcONOMY 455 
(Wolters Kluwer 3d ed. 2010). 
104. Abraham Hollander, Market Structure And Performance In Intellectual Property, 
INT'LJ. INDUS. 0RG. 199,200 (1984). 
105. STANLEY M. BESEN & SHEILA NATARAJ KIRBY, COMPENSATING CREATORS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COLLECTIVES THAT COLLECT 6 (1989). 
106. ANG KWEE TJANG, RIGHTSHOLDERS' PERSPECTIVE IN MANAGING THEIR RIGHTS: 
EcONOMIC INTERESTS AND PROMOTION OF CREATIONS, WIPO SEMINAR ON COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ERA: TRENDS, PROBLEMS, 
AND PROSPECTS 2 (2005), http://www.wipo.intlmdocsarchives/WIPO_CCM_DEL_05/WIPO 
_CCM_DEL_05_7a_E.pdf. 
107. Jonathan Band, Cautionary Tales About Collective Rights Organizations 6 (Geo. 
U. L. Ctr., Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstra 
ct_id=2149036. 
108. See Ivan Reidel, The Taylor Swift Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive Advertising 
and Blanket Licenses, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 731 (2011 ). 
109. Ariel Katz, Copyright Collectives: Good Solution But For Which Problem?, in 
WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 395, 406 (Zimmerman 
et al. ed., 20 I 0). 
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license platform might be the optimal model for direct licenses between 
individual rights holders and potential users. 110 
2. Collective Monitoring and Enforcing in a Digital Era 
In China, copyright enforcement infrastructure is still underdeveloped, 
which makes individual administration of public performance rights 
unreasonably burdensome. As the "pie" theory aforesaid by CA VCA 
illustrates, in spite of the existent drawbacks of collective rights 
management, CMO is still the optimal means to compensate authors 
otherwise they would receive no payments. 
As to the CMO managing extended collective licenses, its monitoring 
and enforcing function extends to non-aligned rights holders before they 
discover that the CMO is in their interest to join. 111 The universal 
membership under an extended collective license system also grants CMOs 
the absolute titles to monitor and enforce public performance rights in the 
market. 112 However, until recently, monitoring by CMOs in China is a low-
tech enterprise. Chinese CMOs employ investigators to physically monitor 
every user on a day-to-day basis. Rights holders in China have criticized 
this futile monitoring technology. For instance, in the karaoke parlors cases, 
the twenty-six monitoring subsidiaries of CA VCA were attacked as being 
responsible for the dramatically increased administrative costs of CAVCA. 
Technologies that enable computerized automatic scanning and tracking 
of all songs, jingles, movies, and video clips 113 might be future substitutes to 
the current brick-mortar monitoring methods adopted by Chinese CMOs. 
The cost-effective monitoring technologies would reduce administrative 
costs of CMOs in China. Some scholars even suggest that, with efficient 
monitoring technologies, individual rights holders can thus enforce public 
performance rights or other related copyrights on their own. 114 The author in 
this article disagrees with the presumption that individual administration of 
copyright is preferable to every author. Some authors may still want to 
entrust their copyright to intermediaries for simple remunerations, just as 
taxpayers resort to tax refund services to get money back. 
In the future, CMOs in China may function as royalty managing 
instruments expertise in tracking the usage of copyrighted works 115 and 
collecting royalties from number users on behalf of both aligned and non-
110. See Reidel, supra note 108, at 805. 
Ill. See Watt, supra note 96. 
112. /d. 
113. See Katz, supra note 109, at 406. 
114. !d. at 407. 
115. In the future, each copyrighted work might receive a digital fingerprint, like the 
identification tags buried in food package, which is traceable both online and on air. See 
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aligned rights holders. Users acquiring licenses directly from rights holders, 
no matter through an online platform or offline channels, can apply to adjust 
the flat fee rate set by CMOs in China. Non-aligned rights holders can 
appeal to a copyright tribunal for fair compensation. Such an adjustable 
royalty collection system managed by Chinese CMOs provides both the 
carrot and the stick to enforce payments from users to authors. 
CLOSING REMARKS 
In the third draft of the new copyright amendment, the legislature of 
China affirmed the employment of an extended collective license system. 
With nascent collective societies and a vulnerable copyright regime, it is an 
opportunity as well as a challenge for China at the helm of the new 
collective management system. A successful operation of such a hybrid 
system requires transparent governance of CMOs and innovative 
mechanisms of CMOs to rebalance the users' access to copyrighted works 
and authors' need for fair remunerations. 
